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Abstract
'Prefigurative politics' has become a popular term for social movements' ethos of unity between means and
ends, but its conceptual genealogy has escaped attention. This article disentangles two components: an 
ethical revolutionary practice, chiefly indebted to the anarchist tradition, which fights domination while 
directly constructing alternatives; and prefiguration as a recursive temporal framing, unknowingly drawn 
from Christianity, in which a future radiates backwards on its past. Tracing prefiguration from the Church 
Fathers to politicised re-surfacings in the Diggers and the New Left, I associate it with Koselleck's 'process of 
reassurance' in a pre-ordained historical path. Contrasted to recursive prefiguration are the generative 
temporal framings couching defences of means-ends unity in the anarchist tradition. These emphasised the 
path dependency of revolutionary social transformation and the ethical underpinnings of anti-authoritarian 
politics. Misplaced recursive terminology, I argue, today conveniently distracts from the generative framing 
of means-ends unity, as the promise of revolution is replaced by that of environmental and industrial 
collapse. Instead of prefiguration, I suggest conceiving of means-ends unity in terms of Bloch's 'concrete 
utopia', and associating it with 'anxious' and 'catastrophic' forms of  hope.
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Introduction
ΕΙΜΑΣΤΕ ΕΙΚΟΝΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΜΕΛΛΟΝ
(We are an image from the future)
Graffiti, 2008 Greek riots
'Prefigurative politics' is by now a familiar term for the ethos of unity of between means and ends 
distinguishing contemporary social movements. Yet the temporal framings awakened by this concept 
continue to lurk in the peripheral vision of activists and scholars alike. Concepts travel accidental paths. 
'Left' and 'Right' are obvious examples of how pure contingency has shaped our political vocabulary. A 
concept often becomes institutionalised, not because of its intrinsic richness or explanatory power, but only
because of its emergence or appropriation in a certain context and at a certain time, and the ensuing 
irreversible process of dissemination and repetition across writers. This is also the case with prefigurative 
politics. Yet despite having reached social movements through a broken line of transmission, this composite 
concept's temporal resonance remains literally preserved in its prefix, raising troubling questions for those 
who employ the term.   
Much of the empirically-driven work on prefigurative politics suffices with received definitions (McCowan, 
2010; Mason, 2014; Howard and Pratt-Boyden, 2013; Baker, 2016), or uses the concept without much 
explanation at all (Young and Schwartz, 2012; Sancho, 2014). Authors who do problematise the term have, 
to date, abstracted from its temporal implications, asking instead e.g. what part of social movement activity 
it is supposed to describe (‘an action, practice, movement, moment or development’ (Van De Sande 2013, 
p.23)); whether it may coexist with reformist agendas (Siltanen et al., 2015); or how it is differently 
expressed in micro- and macro-political contexts (Yates 2015); or focusing on its feminist, queer and spatial 
dimensions (Evans 2009, Wilkinson 2010, Ince 2012, Springer 2014). Scholarship on temporalities in social 
movements, for its part, has considered cycles of contention (McAdam and Sewell 2001); the 'liminoid' 
rhythms of confrontational protest (Krøijer 2010); and 'undomesticated' temporalities (Szerszynski 2002), as
well as twenty-eight chapters (in Lawrence and Churn 2012) on memory and modernity, capital and utopia, 
Negri and Deleuze – but not temporal prefiguration.
The lacuna is serious, since prefigurative terminology burdens the ethos of means-ends unity with a 
misleading temporal framing. In popular usage, the term unproblematically entangles two different notions 
of ends: as expressions of intrinsic value ('an end in itself'), and as desired future situations ('an end result'). 
While the former may be immediately achievable (e.g. though anti-hierarchical organising), the latter's 
intelligibility depends on a temporal framing that connects past, present and future. This article draws 
attention to prefiguration as a recursive temporal framing central to Christian theology, which has also 
played a key role in generating reassurance for religious and political movements. It juxtaposes this to the 
generative temporal framings accompanying the defence of means-ends unity in the anarchist tradition, 
which remains crucial to 'path-dependency' arguments against hierarchical organisation. My central 
argument is that today, misleading prefigurative terminology may work to undermine a generative 
disposition towards the future, deferring the inconvenient confrontation with both the absent promise of 
straightforward revolutionary transformation, and the prospects of long-term and uneven ecosystem and 
industrial collapse. 
This article is not, therefore, a concept-history in the classical sense. Following Jane Guyer's (2007) 
influential discussion of temporal framings as an arena in which individuals and groups seek intelligibility, I 
attempt to “focus on the still-lingering and newly emergent entailments and dissonances that escape their 
terms of reference” (p. 410) in the concept of prefigurative politics. In foregrounding past and present 
temporal imaginaries, and investigating their relationship with ethical revolutionary practice, this article's 
contribution is located at the intersection of ethnology, conceptual history and tendentious political theory. 
The article is divided into three parts. The first opens with background discussion of means-ends unity, then
moves to a detailed exposition of the temporal framing of prefiguration, drawing on the work of Erich 
Auerbach. Tracing prefiguration from the Church Fathers to politicised re-surfacings in the Diggers and the 
New Left, I associate it with Koselleck's 'process of reassurance' in a pre-ordained historical path. The 
second part fills a major gap by examining the earliest and most sustained defences of means-ends unity by 
anarchists, and emphasising their use of generative temporal framings. The third part turns to the 
significance of activist framings that entirely privilege the present, pointing to the affective crisis this  may 
avoid confronting. In suggesting avenues for a generative framing of means-ends unity, I turn to Bloch's 
notion of 'concrete utopia' and to recent work on 'anxious' and 'catastrophic' forms of hope. 
The discussion draws on eclectic sources, but they belong in three distinct categories. First, major 
intellectual contributions which form a basis for the running argument (Auerbach, Koselleck, Bloch). 
Second, activist utterances treated as primary sources for critical analysis (Winstanley, Gorz, Bakunin, 
Goldman, and current anarchists). Finally, secondary scholarly literature is used as background and 
evidence. All translations are mine.
Prefiguration, Recursion and Reassurance
Unlike the ethos for which it stands, the term ‘prefigurative politics’ itself did not emerge organically in 
activist discourse, but was introduced by two social theorists: Carl Boggs, who in 1977 published two 
articles referring to a prefigurative tradition, model or task, and Wini Breines, who two years later 
reformulated the term as 'prefigurative politics' in her discussion of the New Left. I will give these works 
closer attention later on. The concept's popularity today reflects more recent attention to the practices of 
radical environmental, anti-militarist, anti-racist, international solidarity, feminist, LGBT liberation and 
animal rights groups. These converged notably through the alter-globalisation protest wave of the 00s, 
which saw a cross-pollination of action repertoires and networking cultures (Routledge et al. 2007, Juris 
2008). Unlike the trade unions, NGOs and political parties who also participated in alter-global protests, 
radical groups rejected top-down organisation, lobbying, and programmes to seize state power. Instead they
have promoted anti-hierarchical and anti-capitalist practices: decentralised organisation in affinity groups 
and networks; decision-making by consensus; voluntary and non-profit undertakings; lower consumption; 
and an effort to identify and counteract regimes of domination and discrimination (e.g. patriarchy, racism, 
homophobia and ableism) in activists' own lives and interactions. It is with these practices – not with any 
temporal framing – that 'prefigurative politics' is typically associated. 
Authors who address prefigurative politics chiefly in ethical terms also abstract from temporal implications, 
theorising ends in terms of goods and values rather than a potential future state of society. Franks (2014), 
who conceptualises prefigurative politics as virtuous practice, emphasises the intrinsic rather than 
instrumental valuation of means (thus identifying them with ends), and rejecting vanguardism as 
consequentialist. Kuhn (2016) also uses a-temporal ethical language in associating prefigurative politics with
‘the belief that the establishment of an egalitarian society enabling free individual development is depend-
ent on political actors implementing the essential values of such a society immediately, in their ways of 
organizing, living, and fighting’. Finally, Milstein's ethical statement is explicitly dissociated from the future:
We're not putting off the good society until some distant future but attempting to 
carve out room for it in the here and now, however tentative and contorted... 
consistency of means and ends implies an ethical approach to politics. How we act
now is how we want others to begin to act, too. We try to model a notion of 
goodness even as we fight for it. (Milstein 2000)
Nevertheless, a temporal sense of prefiguration – at once literal, and peripheral in current usage – does 
surface in some statements. These directly situate current practices in relation to a possible future, defining 
the concept as ‘the idea that a transformative social movement must necessarily anticipate the ways and 
means of the hoped-for new society’ (Tokar, 2003); as ‘a strategy that is an embryonic representation of an 
anarchist social future’ (Carter and Morland 2004, p.79); or in which the 'pursuit of utopian goals is 
recursively built into the movement’s daily operation and organizational style' (Buechler 2000, p.207). These
temporal associations introduce terminology that goes well beyond the ethical – anticipation, hope, 
maturation, recursion, representation, utopia. To begin unpacking this future orientation, I turn to the 
prefigurative idea as it entered western imaginaries of history and social transformation.
Christian exegesis since Paul the Apostle has approached the Hebrew bible as an Old Testament ‘having a 
shadow of good things to come’ (Heb10:1). Stripped of its normative and national character, its 
Christianised significance lies in its foreshadowing of the Gospel, such that ‘Christ appears to us preceded 
by the shadows and the figures which he himself had cast on Jewish history’ (de Lubac 1938/1988, p.174). 
Thus Paul says that Adam was ‘a figure [τύπος, typos] of him that was to come’ (Rom 5:15), and that the 
trials of the Israelites in the wilderness ‘became examples [τύποι, typoi] for us’ (1Cor.10:6. cf. Vulgate: ‘in 
figura facta sunt nostri’). Erich Auerbach, in his seminal essay on the term ‘figura’ identifies Tertullian 
(c.160-225CE) as the earliest Church Father to develop the sporadic Pauline references to prefiguration into 
a systematic exegetical approach, also known as Typology (Auerbach 1944/1984, pp.28-30). Thus, among 
many other examples, in Adversus Marcionem (3:16) Tertullian treats Moses’s naming of Joshua (Num. 
13:16) as ‘a figure of things to come [figura futurorum fuisse]’, linking Joshua to his namesake, Jesus of 
Nazareth, and Joshua’s leadership of the Israelites to Jesus’ leadership of the ‘second people’ – Christians – 
into the ‘promised land…of eternal life’.
According to Auerbach, ‘from the fourth century on, the usage of the word figura and of the method of 
interpretation connected with it are fully developed in nearly all the Latin Church writers’ (p.34). The 
earliest usage I could find of the specific term prefigure is in the Latin translation of Against Heresies by 
Irenaeus (c.380 CE). Here he writes (IV.32) that ‘the first testament…exhibited a type [typum] of heavenly 
things…prefiguring [præfigurans] the images of those things which exist in the Church’ (Harvey 1857, v.2 
p.255). St. Jerome (c.347-420) centres his 53rd Epistle (to Paulinus, De studi Scripturarum) on how Christ is 
‘predestined and prefigured [prædestinatus autem, et præfiguratus] in the Law and the Prophets’. Thus 
Deuteronomy is a ‘prefiguration of evangelical law [Evangelicae legis praefiguratio]’, and Jonah ‘calls the 
world to repent, his shipwreck prefiguring the Passion of the Lord [passionem Domini præfigurans]’. Many 
other examples use different terminology, from Joshua’s lay of the land ‘describing the celestial spiritual 
kingdom of Jerusalem’, to Esther who ‘in the figure of the Church [in Ecclesiae typo] liberates her people 
from danger’ (Migne 1845 v.22 540-549).
It was St. Augustine of Hyppo (354-430) who ‘developed this idea…profoundly and completely’ (Auerbach 
op.cit., p.43). Auerbach gives many examples, to which we may add Augustine’s statements in City of God 
that Cain, ‘founder of the earthly city...signifies the Jews who killed Christ the shepherd of men, which Abel 
the shepherd of sheep was prefiguring [præfigurabat]’ (XV.7; Migne 1845, 41.445); and that ‘the kingdom of
Saul…was the shadow of a kingdom yet to come’ and therefore David passed over the opportunity to slay 
Saul (1 Sam 24.1-7) ‘for the sake of what it was prefiguring [propter illud, quod præfigurabat]’ (XVII.6; Migne
1845, 41.536-7).
Prefiguration, then, is a recursive temporal framing in which events at one time are interpreted as a figure  
pointing to its fulfilment in later events, with the figure cast in the model of the fulfilment. In the exegetical 
utterances just reviewed, the interpretation is retrospective – both the figure and its fulfilment (Old and 
New Testaments) precede it in time. Retrospectively, we could today say that Paul’s statements ‘prefigured’ 
the fuller accounts of typology in Jerome and Augustine. However, prefiguration can also be invoked 
prospectively, with current events said to prefigure future ones. This is the sense in which John the Baptist’s 
statement about ‘he that comes after me’ (Matthew 3:11) announces prefiguration. Equally of importance 
to the Christian scheme, such prospective prefiguration is carried over from exegesis to eschatology, with 
each figure-fulfilment dyad pointing to a third, final fulfilment and completion in the Second Coming. In this 
light, argues Auerbach (58-9),
the history of no epoch even has the practical self-sufficiency which…[in the 
modern view] resides in the accomplished fact…the event is enacted according to 
an ideal model which is a prototype situated in the future and thus far only 
promised…every future model, though incomplete as history, is already fulfilled in 
God and has existed from all eternity in his providence.
Given the centrality of this temporal framing to the Christian worldview, it is unsurprising that oppositional 
movements in medieval and early modern Europe often couched their efforts in millenarian terms (Cohn, 
1957). A case in point is Gerrard Winstanley, for whom prefiguration became the cornerstone of a 
comprehensive revolutionary theology. In his pamphlet The True Levellers Standard Advanced, the Diggers' 
leader explicitly justifies their direct action strategy – expropriation of the commons and withholding of 
wage labour – as a millenarian fulfilment of biblical prophecy. Winstanley  believed it was possible to 
immanentise the eschaton by establishing an egalitarian society in the present (Hill 1986). Instead of a 
literal Second Coming, he expected the final rising of the ‘Spirit of Christ, which is the Spirit of universal 
Community and Freedom’ to take place in the persons of those who ‘lay the Foundation of making the 
Earth a Common Treasury’ (Winstanley 1649, p.14). Therefore, he declares, ‘they that are resolved to work 
and eat together, making the Earth a Common Treasury, doth joyn hands with Christ, to lift up the Creation 
from Bondage, and restores all things from the Curse' (p.16). Later on, Winstanley uses his own typology in 
addressing concerns about repression and hardship (ibid.):
And we are assured, that in the strength of this Spirit that hath manifested himself
to us, we shall not be startled, neither at Prison nor Death... For by this work we 
are assured... that Bondage shall be removed, Tears wiped away, and all poor 
People by their righteous Labours shall be relieved, and freed from Poverty and 
Straits; For in this work of Restoration there will be no begger in Israel: For surely, 
if there was no Begger in literal Israel, there shall be no Begger in Spiritual Israel 
the Anti-type, much more.
Winstanley’s final statement does not, in fact, refer directly to scripture, but to an observation Winstanley 
himself made frequently in his writings (Knott 2011, pp.87-8). Nevertheless, it functions to describe the 
Diggers's work as a fulfilment of an Old Testament figure. In the terms defined above, Winstanley's 
prefiguration is retrospective, albeit in the present perfect tense. The Diggers and their actions are not a 
figure, but the fulfilment of the ‘Spiritual Israel’ prefigured in the Bible.
I would like to argue that Winstanley’s prefigurative thinking is an example of the ‘process of reassurance’, 
identified by Reinhard Koselleck among 'groups of activists who wished to...be part of a history moving 
under its own momentum, where one only aided this forward motion' (Koselleck 1977/2004, pp.199). 
Koselleck sees the process of reassurance as 'a means of strengthening the will to hurry the advent of the 
planned future'. Although he associates it with the later 18C notion of 'making history', there is little doubt 
that earlier models of political prognosis which never 'fundamentally transcend[ed] the horizon of a 
Christian eschatology' (p.197) were carried over into it. Winstanley's assurance that the Diggers' actions are 
the foretold fulfilment of biblical figures is a case in point. Whether the future is announced as the 
imperative of a divine or world-historical plan, the framing 'serves... as a relief – one’s will becomes the 
executor of transpersonal events – and as a legitimation which enables one to act in good conscience', as 
well as 'an ideological amplifier, which reached out to others and caught them up' (p.199). 
I would like to point to a resurfacing of this process of reassurance in Andre Gorz's 'The Way Forward' (Gorz,
1968), published in the New Left Review shortly after the French uprising. This article stands out because its
use of prefiguration predates Boggs by almost a decade, while strikingly integrating the term into an 
authoritarian Marxist framework. This provides an opportunity to examine secular, political recursive 
reasoning in isolation from anarchistic ethical strategy. Indeed, Gorz employs familiar stereotypes of 
anarchism as ‘relying on mass spontaneity, seeing insurrection as the royal road to revolution' and 'the 
theory of all or nothing according to which the revolution must be a quasi-instantaneous act' (p.48). Arguing
also against ‘the immediate construction of socialism and of communism’ (p.51), Gorz calls for a 'Guevarist' 
strategy, in which the revolutionary vanguard performs an educative role. The vanguard party ‘prefigures 
the proletarian State, and reflects for the working class its capacity to be a ruling class’ (p.58). In Gorz's 
scheme, means do not prefigure ultimate ends, but other means. Rather than prefiguring a ‘post-
revolutionary society’, the party's ‘central organs, by their cohesion and capacity for political analysis, will 
prefigure the central power of the transitional period’ (p.61). 
Unlike his contemporary Marcuse's isolated comment about the 'ingression of the future into the present' 
(1969, p.88-89), Gorz's repeated use of prefiguration cannot be dismissed as mere literary flourish. Unlike  
Winstanley's, his framing is prospective, with a present figure looking forward to its future fulfilment. Yet it 
relies, no less than theological framings, on a universal point of view bridging past, present and future within 
an unfolding plan; in this case, the orthodox Marxist revolutionary programme. The role of the vanguard is 
worked out backwards from the only conceivable (to Gorz) endgame, in which it seizes state power. Only the 
historico-philosophical grounding of this program, with Marx and Lenin's thick account of class and party, 
yields a sufficiently determinate image of the future (the workers' state) to form a model for the present. Only 
the  givenness of a revolutionary scenario and its protagonists can lend intelligibility to such symbolic 
projection from the future. This is not to endorse ambitious claims about millenarian recidivism at the heart of
the Marxist project (Rothbard 1972). At issue here is determinacy, not determinism. Revolution may not be 
guaranteed, but the one path that could lead to it is decided. Even more significantly, prefiguration is used 
here as an almost-transparent conceit. The educative role Gorz describes would lead the workers' movement 
to become stronger, fulfil more of its potential, or advance to another stage of development. Yet this 
‘prefiguration as training’ can equally be viewed within a generative temporal framing, which develops 
forward in time without recursive projection from an imagined future endgame. Yet Gorz wants the party to 
educate by modelling victory, hurrying on the development of class consciousness. In other words, the 
prefigurative conceit is openly intended to activate a process of reassurance among the working class. 
As we shall see later on, it is the absence of reassurance that prefiguration now obscures. For now, I would 
like to look more closely at the generative temporal framings which have accompanied the ethos of means-
ends unity now known as 'prefigurative politics'.  These appear earliest and most consistently in the 
anarchist tradition, which none of the originators of the concept served very well. 
Ethical Practice and Generative Temporality
Carl Boggs published his article ‘Marxism, Prefigurative Communism and the Problem of Workers’ Control’ 
in the decennial double issue of Radical America, a magazine started in 1967 by Paul Bhule and members of
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), but which ‘long outlived its seedbed’ to become ‘an eclectic left 
publication, bound to no single strategy and certainly to no organization’ (Center for Digital Scholarship, 
n.d.). The article's primary interest is in council insurgencies in Russia, Italy and Germany between 1917-
1920, and it defines the term ‘prefigurative’ as ‘the embodiment, within the ongoing political practice of a 
movement, of those forms of social relations, decision-making, culture, and human experience that are the 
ultimate goal’ (1977-8, p.101). Boggs attests (pers. comm. 02.07.2016) that he arrived at the term on his 
own, inspired at the time by Gramsci and Bookchin, but unaware of its use by the Church Fathers or by 
Gorz. Hence the broken line of transmission.
Boggs’s definition above may be called a formal definition, limited to the very correspondence between 
ultimate goal and ongoing practice, while remaining silent on their content. Contrast this to his statements 
in his article in Theory and Society the same year, ‘Revolutionary Process, Political Strategy and the Dilemma
of Power’ (Boggs, 1977b). Here, he refers to the prefigurative task as one ‘which expresses the ultimate 
ends of the revolutionary process itself: popular self-emancipation, collective social and authority relations, 
socialist democracy’ (p.359). Here instead is a substantive definition which unlike the formal one is not 
limited to the mere correspondence between goals and practices, but imbues both with particular value-
content. A substantive definition is also used by Breines, in her paper first presented at the 1979 annual 
meetings of the American Sociological Association and revised for publication in Social Problems. Brienes, 
who credits Boggs, defines prefigurative politics as ‘attempt to embody personal and antihierarchical values 
…to develop the seeds of liberation and the new society (prior to and in the process of revolution) through 
notions of participatory democracy grounded in [noncapitalist and communitarian] counter-institutions’ 
(Breines 1980, p.421).
The formal definition leaves prefigurative politics open to association with widely varied practices, from the 
courts-in-waiting of crown pretenders to parliamentary shadow cabinets. Even the cultural practices of 
white nationalist groups “allow members to participate in relationships that 'prefigure' Aryan dominance” 
(Futrell and Simi, 2004, p.16). What bridges the formal and substantive definitions is a specific political 
context, namely opposition to authoritarian variants of Marxism, whose ends and means do not correspond
in this way. On its opponents’ account, while authoritarian Marxism does posit as its end-goal a stateless 
communist society ‘without force, without compulsion, without subordination’ (Lenin 1918/1992, p.80), it 
proceeds via top-down structures and the seizure of state power. There is no correspondence between 
means and ends, and revolutionary organisation and action are approached instrumentally. This critique, 
and the alternative now identified with 'prefigurative politics', were first worked out not by the New Left, 
but by anarchists starting a century earlier.
Brienes (1980, p.14) accredits anarchism and radical pacifism as the ‘real forerunners’ of the New Left, but 
does not go beyond naming Paul Goodman and Murray Bookchin as influential representatives. In his article
for Theory and Society, Boggs dedicates all of one page to the anarchist contribution, dismissing it as having 
merely ‘emerged in response to organized Marxism…flailing away helplessly from the outside’, ‘trapped in 
its own spontaneism’ and ‘preoccupation with small face-to-face “organic” institutions’ (Boggs, 1977b, 
p.382). In Radical America, while acknowledging that the prefigurative tradition ‘begins with the nineteenth
century anarchists’ (1977-8, p.100), he outdoes himself (and Gorz) in alleging that the anarchists ‘scorned 
politics’, showed ‘contempt for “theory” and “organization” in any form’ and were ‘basically romantic and 
utopian’, looking ‘to an idyllic past rooted in a primitive collectivism’ (p.105) – all without a shard of 
evidence. What is more, having first commended prefigurative strategy for viewing ‘statism and 
authoritarianism as special obstacles to be overturned’ (p.103), Boggs seems to recoil from the  
consequences of his own argument, referring almost immediately to prefigurative structures as ‘a nucleus 
of a future socialist state’ (p.104) and praising Councillism for not ‘contemptuously dismiss[ing]’ the 
‘contestation for state power’ (p.105). While recent writers on prefigurative politics have done more to 
acknowledge its indebtedness to anarchism, what follows is a closer examination of key utterances on 
means-ends unity in the anarchist tradition. As we shall now see, these attached their ethos consistently to 
a temporal framing in which recursive prefiguration does not appear.
The formative conflict between the authoritarian and libertarian factions in the First International, 
personified in Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin, came to a head after the fall of the Paris Commune of 1871 
(Eckhardt 2016). When the closed General Council of the International resolved that workers must form 
their own political parties, anarchists held a counter-conference at Sonvilier (Bernese Jura). They produced 
a circular which defined the counter-program of the social revolution as ‘the emancipation of the workers 
by the workers themselves' and rejected 'any directing authority, even be it elected and consented to by the
workers' (Jura Federation, 1871). The Circular closes: 
 
The future society should be nothing else than the universalisation of the 
organisation that the International has formed for itself. We must therefore strive 
to make this organisation as close as possible to our ideal. How could one expect 
an egalitarian and free society to emerge out of an authoritarian organisation! It is
impossible. The International, embryo of the future human society, must be, from 
now on, the faithful image of our principles of liberty and federation, and must 
reject from within any principle tending toward authority, toward dictatorship. 
 
This argument, with its embryonic metaphor, refers to what today might be called a ‘path dependency’ 
between revolutionary practices and results, where ‘initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in 
that same direction’ and ‘the trajectory of change up to a certain point constrains the trajectory after that 
point’ (Kay 2005, p.553). Choices about organization (top-down or bottom-up) end up determining both the
form of the revolution (seizure of state power or abolition of the state) and its end result (modified 
hierarchical structures or free communism). Note that, although connected to 'principles', the argument 
from path dependency does not emphasise the intrinsic value of practices, but justifies means-ends 
correspondence in consequentialist terms. The seizure of state power is not rejected solely on ethical 
grounds, despite being deemed an effective revolutionary means. Rather, it is rejected as ineffective, since it
does not result in a classless society but in dictatorship. 
In the same year, Bakunin too insisted that the International should organise the masses ‘from the bottom 
up, beginning with the social life of the masses and their real aspirations’ and ‘not by forcing the natural life 
of the masses into the straitjacket of the State’. (1871a, p.258) This led him to praise the Communards’ 
disinterest in seizing state power (1871b, p.268-270):
our friends, the Paris socialists, believed that revolution could neither be made 
nor brought to its full development except by the spontaneous and continued 
action of the masses, the groups and the associations of the people…[society] can 
and should reorganise itself, not from the top down according to an ideal plan 
dressed up by wise men or scholars nor by decrees promulgated by some 
dictatorial power or even by a national assembly…[but] from the bottom up, by 
the free association or federation of workers.
By ‘spontaneous’ Bakunin does not mean impulsive or improvised, but self-directed and voluntary. Such 
social reorganisation, carried out directly at the grassroots, is therefore antagonistic to imposed artificial 
structures, which reproduce the alienation of power. Like the Jura anarchists, in calling for immediate social 
reorganisation Bakunin is thinking about the long-term effects of present actions and structures, and the 
affordances locked in once a choice between diverging paths is made. By extending and defending their 
own bottom-up forms of organisation, revolutionary masses can directly achieve some of their objectives. 
Instrumentally conceived, such organisation not only avoids the pitfalls of authoritarianism and 
bureaucracy, but creates a stronger social base for strikes and insurrections. 
This emphasis on immediate implementation would later become folded into the central anarchist concept of 
direct action. This concept extends beyond its current association with disruptive tactics to a principle of 
action without intermediaries. Through direct action, a group or individual uses their own power to prevent an
injustice or supply a good, as opposed to appealing to an external agent (Gordon, 2008, pp.34-40). Kropotkin 
thus called on workers to expropriate productive resources and infrastructures, as 'the first step towards a 
reorganisation of our production on Socialist principles' (Kropotkin, 1988, p.32-3). While Kropotkin had a mass 
uprising in mind, more localised examples of direct expropriation include land and factory occupations, urban 
squatting, and digital piracy. With equal importance, direct action includes immediate social reconstruction to 
the extent possible. The expansion, deepening, and defence of egalitarian social relations achieves its aims 
immediately, just as a mass trespass directly stops fracking. In both cases the achievement may be temporary 
or fragile, but it does not involve intermediaries. There is an evident parallel between this wider sense of 
direct action, and current movements' preference for 'prefigurative politics' over lobbying, litigation and party 
politics. At stake in all cases – disruption, expropriation and reconstruction – is the non-alienation of collective 
power, and a rejection of the politics of representation. 
The aftermath of the October revolution vindicated anarchists’ warnings about means and ends, 
occasioning Emma Goldman’s landmark statement in her Afterword to My Disillusionment in Russia (1924). 
Concluding her memoir, Goldman asserts that “No revolution can ever succeed as a factor of liberation 
unless the means used to further it be identical in spirit and tendency with the purposes to be achieved”:
All human experience teaches that methods and means cannot be separated from
the ultimate aim. The means employed become, through individual habit and 
social practice, part and parcel of the final purpose; they influence it, modify it, 
and presently the aims and means become identical.
This is again a statement of path dependency. Notice, however, the abundance of temporal allusions in 
these final passages (original emphases):
To-day is the parent of to-morrow. The present casts its shadow far into the 
future…Revolution that divests itself of ethical values thereby lays the foundation 
of injustice, deceit, and oppression for the future society. The means used to 
prepare the future become its cornerstone…the ethical values which the 
revolution is to establish in the new society must be initiated with the 
revolutionary activities of the so-called transitional period. Revolution is the 
mirror of the coming day; it is the child that is to be the Man of To-morrow.
Like the embryonic metaphor in the Sonvilier Circular, Goldman's account of means gelling into ends has the
present generating the future. This generative temporal framing is situated in 'normal' forward-looking 
time, without recursion. Revolutionaries' visions for the future are themselves present-tense mental 
experiences and discursive exchanges. More importantly, the interpretation of the present is self-contained 
– dependent on ethical values rather than a promised or imagined prototype. Maturation is not guaranteed 
(the child 'is to be', not 'will be'). Yet what is already accomplished has the 'practical self-sufficiency' which 
Auerbach associates with the modern view. 
This is shown to be a major conceptual difference, rather than a difference of phrasing and emphasis, when 
we consider how the experimental nature of lived ethics undercuts recursive reasoning. Rejecting the 
assured blueprints of utopian socialists and Soviet planners alike, anarchists have tended to privilege 
repeated, concrete experiences of social struggle in which the tension between aspirations and experience 
is continuously worked out. Goldman describes revolution as “first and foremost, the transvaluator, the 
bearer of new values. It is the great teacher of the new ethics, inspiring man with a new concept of life” 
(ibid., original emphases). She employs the Nietzschean term ‘transvaluation’ (Umwertung) without 
mentioning the philosopher's name, yet it is clear that she took from Nietzsche an attitude that embraces 
radical open-endedness in the generation of new social visions and practices (Rossdale, 2015; Miething, 
2016). The emergence of values and relationships transcending domination is an uncertain process, playful 
as well as dangerous.
Mobilisation gives rise to unexpected forms of collective power and solidarity, as well as to renewed 
scrutiny of systems of domination. This drives a process of self-education, challenging activists to partly 
undo their own socialisation. As Bookchin (1980) would later put this, ‘the very process of building an 
anarchist movement from below is viewed as the process of consociation, self-activity and self-
management that must ultimately yield that revolutionary self that can act upon, change and manage an 
authentic society’. However, this implies that the ends expressed in practice undergo constant re-
evaluation. Such an open-ended politics leaves any notion of future 'accomplishment' at least partly 
indeterminate, and thus too unstable to coherently serve as a source of recursive prefiguration. Such a 
partial indeterminacy of ends is only intelligible within a generative temporal framing, wherein the future is 
seen as the product of the affordances and contingencies preceding it. 
Absent Promise, Crisis and Hope 
So far we have seen that the temporal framings accompanying anarchist accounts of ethical strategy have 
been generative rather than prefigurative in the temporal sense, seeking to intervene in shaping the future 
out of the present. Its experimental nature pulls such a framing away from the process of reassurance, and 
towards a more modest view of future-oriented designs as the 'product of situationally and chronologically 
determined insight which goes no further than these limitations' (Koselleck, ibid.). However, if non-
hierarchical social relations are to be extended and defended with neither the assurances of historical 
momentum, nor a full determinacy of ends, what remains of activist dispositions towards the future? 
One response – 'perhaps nothing' – marks a recent strand in activist expression which attempts to absorb 
revolutionary accomplishment entirely into current ethical practices, dissociating from the future 
altogether. This often accompanies, as with Milstein (ibid.), the anti-Leninist refusal to defer ethical practice 
until 'after the revolution'.  A few illustrative examples:
The revolution exists in every moment of our lives...in the present, not in some 
mythic possible future. (Monkey, 1999) 
it is crucial that we seek change not in the name of some doctrine or grand cause, 
but on behalf of ourselves, so that we will be able to live more meaningful 
lives...rather than direct our struggle towards world-historical changes which we 
will not live to witness. (CrimethInc. 2000)
The revolution is now, and we must let the desires we have about the future 
manifest themselves in the here and now as best as we can. When we start doing 
that, we stop fighting for some abstract condition for the future and instead start 
fighting to see those desires realized in the present... as a flowering of one’s self-
determined existence (Hodgson, 2003)
Approvingly, Springer theorises such outlooks as a micro-political anarchism, which rejects “end-state 
politics”, prefers “permanent insurrection” to “final revolution”, and “abandons any pretext of achieving a 
completely free and harmonious society in the future and instead focuses on the immediacies of anarchist 
praxis and a prefigurative politics of direct action in the present” (2014, p.264).  To be sure, there are limits 
to how far lived practices can actually go – both due to external limits (that we still live in a capitalist, 
patriarchal society), and internal ones (that we cannot immediately or completely undo our troubled 
histories and hierarchical socialisation). Nevertheless, in such expressions the very desire to inhabit social 
settings which work  to undo domination and motivates their construction. All these formulations amplify 
the intrinsic value of anti-hierarchical relations by tying them to personal fulfilment, with individual 
liberation and social contention each supplying the other's motivation. Recalling the slogan also attributed 
to Goldman – ‘if I can’t dance, it’s not my revolution’ (Shulman 1991), this reading of anarchist practice 
turns away from a politics of self-sacrifice towards a politics of self-realisation and revolutionary lifestyle 
(Portwood-Stacer, 2013). 
The turn to the present has been criticised as a symptom of activist networks becoming mere cultural 
scenes, abandoning revolutionary politics for self-seeking pursuits (Bookchin 1995, cf. Davis 2010). Another 
critique (Olson 2011) has been that the short-term focus on cultural reproduction and confrontational 
tactics neglects movement-building and class solidarity. My own critique is more basic. I would like to argue 
that expressions of presentism, in their eagerness to avoid a Leninist disposition towards the future, also 
conveniently sidestep an anarchistic generative disposition and its consequences. While the statements 
above dismiss the future as 'distant', 'mythical' or 'abstract', no threat to lived ethical practice is posed by 
imagining long-term social scenarios, or thinking generations ahead. Instead, I would suggest that 
presentism covers for a reluctance to confront the absent promise of revolutionary accomplishment, as well
as the bleak prospects that become evident once activists approach the future generatively. 
Guyer (op.cit.) considers the evacuation of the near future in current hegemonic temporal framings, as 
neoliberal monetraism defers prosperity to future horizons. She notes the curious similarity between 
neoliberal and evangelical framings, in which the present is read for signs of promised future fulfilment. For 
transformative movements, a parallel process has been the evacuation of the future by traditional forms of 
revolutionary expectation. A century or more ago, anarchists who had experienced the revolutions of the 
1848 and 1871 could still expect that 'when the hour of the People's Revolution strikes again' (Bakunin 
1866, p.85) it would raise the 'simultaneous revolutionary alliance and action of all the people of the 
civilized world' (p.96) against reaction. Kropotkin (1886) too was convinced that 'a great revolution is 
growing up in Europe' which would see 'a rapid modification of outgrown economical and political 
institutions' and 'a displacement of wealth and political power', over a period 'lasting for several years'. 
Such expectations did not require an appeal to historical inevitability; they were based on an instinctive 
understanding of cycles of contention, and an appreciation – too high, in hindsight – of the generative 
power of mass movements invested in their material and cultural base. Today, however, even such a 
guarded promise of revolution in advanced capitalist countries seems far fetched. The past century has 
continued to see democratic and socialist political revolutions, as well as military coups and civil wars, but 
none have achieved a classless society. The tremendous growth in states' military and surveillance powers, 
the continuing appeal of nationalism, and insights as to the lack of any keystone centre of power open to 
definitive attack, have also rendered such optimistic expectations obsolete. 
Even more crucially, any generative disposition towards the future must now account for industrial 
civilisation's transgression of multiple planetary tipping points, as global resource-use continues to grow 
unabated (Hughes at al., 2013). Hence, expectations of transformation must be projected into a future 
shaped by runaway climate change, energy depletion, ecosystem collapse, inequality, deprivation and 
conflict (Haraway 2016, Danowski and Viveiros de Castro 2017). My argument is that the absence of 
revolutionary promise and awareness of converging planetary crises have together cast transformative 
politics into a  crisis. The affective space attached to disposition towards the future, long vacated by 
reassurance and even expectant optimism, is now filled with anxiety, frustration and guilt. Presentism 
sidesteps this crisis by avoiding any disposition towards the future altogether. The same denial is served by 
the continued use of 'prefigurative' terminology. Its literal and surplus meanings, faintly resonating with 
reassurance, point down the dead end of recursive temporality. This is a confusing distraction from the 
urgent task of re-working generative framings to account for protracted, uneven and irreversible collapse. 
If the term 'prefigurative politics' can be safely abandoned, what could replace it? A focus on substance, as 
in 'anti-hierarchical politics', could certainly go quite far. But can means-ends unity and ethical practice be 
framed even more productively, in a way that (a) suggests generative, rather than recursive temporality and 
(b) may encourage affective dispositions other than reassurance, which can nevertheless sustain the 
confrontation with converging crises? In closing, I would like to offer preliminary thoughts on one possible 
avenue for addressing this question, drawing on Ernst Bloch's concept of 'concrete utopia'.
In his project to reinstate utopianism in Marxist thinking, Bloch looks beyond literary descriptions of model 
societies to the ‘positive utopian function’ of more concrete imaginings which ‘extend, in an anticipating 
way, existing material into the future possibilities of being different and better’ (Bloch 1995, p.144). The 
anchoring in present reality separates this from what Bloch calls 'abstract utopianism', which ranges from 
social blueprints to personal daydreams (Levitas 1989). This is because concrete utopianism 'does not play 
around and get lost in an Empty-Possible, but psychologically anticipates a Real-Possible'. Theological 
prefiguration and its lingering resonances clearly belong in the abstract category.  In distinction, Bloch's 
'not-yet' faces all possible future states of the real world, while drawing hope from the tendencies and 
latencies of a self-transforming present. As a result, concrete-utopian impulses correspond not to fantasy, 
but to hope and action.
Utopian function as the comprehended activity of the expectant emotion, of the 
hope-premonition, maintains the alliance with all that is still morning like in the 
world. Utopian function understands what is exploding, because it is this itself in a
very condensed way: its Ratio is the unweakened Ratio of a militant optimism. 
Therefore: the act-content of hope is, as a consciously illuminated, knowingly 
elucidated content, the positive utopian function.
Bloch's temporal framing of concrete utopianism is generative, seeing it as a thought-behaviour which 
‘contains within it the forward surge of an achievement which can be anticipated’ (148). To be sure, Bloch 
maintains fealty to the Marxist tradition and some attachment to its determinacy can be felt in his account 
of concrete utopia. True to colours, he puts his erudite gloss on the obligatory dismissal of anarchism, 
personified in Stirner and Proudhon's 'petit-bourgeois' sensibilities and in Bakunin's 'complete monomania 
of hatred of authority' (p.573). Alongside its individualism, Bloch asserts, the anarchist image of freedom is 
'a bit of future in the future, for which no present prerequisites exist anywhere at all', while 'certain 
anarchic themes' are 'already to be found in Marxism, sensibly enough not as present postulates but as 
prophecies and conclusions' (p.574). Here Bloch does himself a true disservice by failing to link his concrete 
utopia to what Boggs would later call the 'prefigurative tradition' of anarchism and councillism. Even more 
than the mental act-content of hope, it is the construction of living alternatives that can give concrete 
expression to the positive utopian function. With Marxist prejudices at arms length, a 'politics of concrete 
utopia' might indeed replace 'prefigurative politics' as a colourful descriptor for means-ends unity.
While the idea concrete utopia successfully binds ethical practice to generative temporal framings, Bloch's 
attached principle of hope, drawn from the not-yet, requires further modification.  What becomes of this 
principle, once anticipation addresses itself not only to the fruition of concrete-utopian efforts, but also to 
the inevitable consequences of industrial and neoliberal over-reach? Though significant conceptual work 
remains to be done here, a promising start may be found in the ideas of 'anxious' and 'catastrophic' hope.  
In her recent ethnography among practical sustainability activists in Turkey, Bürge Abiral (2015) identifies 
these forms of hope in her respondents' dispositions towards the future. Unsurprisingly, activists promoting
community sustainability, bioremediation, energy transition and Permaculture system design are among the
most attuned to prognoses of collapse. Abirail associates the idea of 'anxious hope' with the grain of anxiety
always attending the 'belief that small actions matter...that it is not too late to act' (p.93). 
Instead of being an opposite of hope, anxiety is a companion to it. This hope rests 
on thin ice. The desired results attached to hope, and the effects that are hoped 
for may never materialize, and the permaculturists are well aware of it...Instead of
driving permaculturists to despair, the anxiety that they feel about the future 
accompanies their hopeful condition and all the more pushes them to act in the 
present. (p. 96)
Coexisting with anxious hope is catastrophic hope, an affect which 'combines a catastrophic vision of the 
future with the conviction that good things will continue to happen despite and because of approaching 
disasters' (p.97). Catastrophic hope serves as a fallback, providing succour even as it attends to worst case 
scenarios short of extinction. Such hope can look forward to the adoption of radical alternatives out of the 
urgency and necessity of a decaying world. From this there can also emerge a reading of catastrophe as a 
harbinger of revolutionary openings in the future. This form of hope is reminiscent of Lear's concept of 
'radical hope' (2009), used to describe the choice to sustain ethics and dignity even through the passage of 
a way of life. Meditating on the survival of the Native American Crow people, Lear contrasts radical hope to 
mere optimism, linking it to a virtue ethic centred on courage and imagination. Taken together, anxious and 
catastrophic forms of hope suggest promising alternatives to the temptations of reassurance, prefiguration 
and denial. 
Conclusion
In exposing the genealogy of prefiguration, this article has sought to wrest lived ethical practice from the 
ghostly hand of recursive temporality. To theorise such practice as concrete utopia more adequately 
captures its generative framing in the anarchist tradition, and eschews the confusing theological and 
historico-philosophical resonances attached to prefiguration. The approach I have offered seeks 
confrontation with a toxic future despite the absence of revolutionary promise, drawing on anxious and 
catastrophic hope to embolden this long-suppressed engagement. More broadly, this article has attempted 
to show how one may discuss somewhat rarefied theoretical issues without losing touch with activist 
expression and concerns.
In terms of further research, the reopening of generative temporal framings to the future may support 
efforts to theorise pathways to radical transformation through the process of collapse. Shedding both 
presentism and the last vestiges of reassurance, such a discussion would bind generative temporal framings 
to a sober appreciation of the affordances and tendencies of infrastructures and socio-technical systems 
(Brucato, 2013; see also Ringel 2012; Firth and Robinson, 2014; Groves, 2016). Yet this discussion requires 
far wider participation. Taking the ethnography of revolutionary futures to diverse movements practising 
their ends, such research may bring concrete experience and shared ethical commitments to bear on 
transformative political theory. Facing forward, we only have one another to rely on.
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